Adopting State Law as the Federal Rule of Decision:
A Proposed Test
In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,' the Supreme Court removed the
power of the federal courts to declare independent federal common
law in deciding issues which would be governed by state law in state
courts. Later cases have held, however, that where the matter before
the court is closely related to a federal function, state law does not
govern of its own force and the federal courts have the responsibility
to fashion a federal rule to decide the issue.' In Clearfield Trust Co.
v. United States,' the Court indicated that, unless Congress has
specified otherwise, a federal court in this situation has the option
either to "adopt" state law as the content of the federal rule or to
develop uniform federal law5 to resolve the question.'
Since Clearfield, a body of case law has developed affirming
and elaborating the availability of the choice to adopt state law. But
a coherent standard for determining when to exercise this option has
not emerged. A recent line of cases arising in the context of the
Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) loan programs indicates
the unsatisfactory state of the law on adoption. In suits by the
Government against an auctioneer for the conversion of chattels on
which the Government had a mortgage, the courts have had to
determine whether the auctioneer's lack of knowledge of the mortgage is a defense against liability. Some circuits have adopted state
law to resolve the issue, 7 while others have used a uniform federal
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 See text and notes at notes 11-16 infra.

See Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the
Choice of Nationaland State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 798-801 (1957). Judge
Friendly has christened the law developed by federal courts in such situations the "new
federal common law." Friendly, In Praiseof Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383 (1964). The Supreme Court has suggested the term "law of independent
federal judicial decision." United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 308 (1947).
318 U.S. 363 (1943).
Terminology in the adoption context tends to be confusing. The major terms, as used
in this comment, are introduced in this note with references to notes providing further explanations. When an issue is substantially related to a federal program (see note 16 infra), the
source of law (see note 9 infra) is federal, and the courts must fashion a federal rule to decide

the issue. The content of this federal rule may be determined either by adopting state law or
by developing or following uniform federal law on the issue.
I "In our choice of the applicable federal rule we have occasionally selected state law."

318 U.S. at 367.
1 United States v. Chappell Livestock Auction, Inc., 523 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Union Livestock Sales Co., 298 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1962); United States v. Kramel,
234 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1956).
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law. 8 These opposite results reached in virtually identical situations
by courts purporting to apply the same criteria for determining
whether to adopt state law indicate disagreement or confusion in
interpreting these criteria.
In order to suggest improvements in the process of deciding
whether to adopt state law, this comment first examines the policies
involved in the decision and the criteria presently employed by the
courts. An analysis and evaluation of these criteria leads to a proposed approach to the adoption question which resolves some of the
confusion evident in present decisions. Finally, the proposed approach is applied to the FmHA cases to provide a concrete illustration of its operation.
1.

A.

THE CONCEPT AND PURPOSE OF ADOPTION OF STATE LAW

Prerequisites for the Existence of the Adoption Issue

Before a court can reach the issue of whether to adopt state law
as the content of a federal rule in the case before it, the court must
determine that the prerequisites for the adoption choice are present.
First, the source9 of the law applicable to the litigation must be
federal.'" Generally, the source of applicable law is held to be federal
when the question involved in the litigation is substantially related
to a federal governmental function." More specifically, a federal
United States v. Carson, 372 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1967); United States v. Sommerville,
324 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 909 (1964); United States v. Matthews,
244 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1957); see United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1971); Cassidy
Comm'n Co. v. United States, 387 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1967).
1 The term "source" of law is a potentially confusing one and perhaps best defined by
the method employed here, describing the situations in which courts have found a federal
"source" of law. In these situations the federal interests are sufficiently involved to mandate
that the question be governed by a federal rule of law, even though the court may still choose
to adopt state law as the content of that federal rule.
11See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591-94 (1973); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943); Mishkin, supra note 3, at 798801; cf. Friendly, supra note 3 at 410.
1,Mishkin, supra note 3, at 801. For criticism of the breadth afforded the concept of
governmental functions and of the possible ramifications of this breadth under Clearfield, se6
Comment, FederalJurisdiction-Choiceof Law-FederalLaw of Negotiable Instruments, 6
ViLL. L. REv. 388 (1961); 18 TUL. L. REv. 152 (1943). See also Note, The Federal Common
Law, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1512, 1526-29 (1969) (criticizing the use of the federal functions concept
as a basis for choice of law).
The problem of adopting state law has arisen primarily in situations involving governmental functions, and this comment focuses on the adoption issue in this context. However,
a recent case has suggested that state law may be considered in another context in which
federal common law has been utilized, that of litigation by a state. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972). This suggestion may reflect increased willingness to resort to
state law in this area. Compare id. with Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670
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source has been found in cases involving activities stemming from
a treaty,'2 a statute, 3 or the Constitution;' 4 in cases involving a
federal relationship;' 5 and in cases arising out of a particular federal
program.'"
This first prerequisite removes a court's choice of law decision
from the mandates of Erie7 and the Rules of Decision Act'8 to apply
state law. The reason for this effect is that when the source of law
is federal, the rule of decision is federal;' 9 state law, even if adopted
as the content of the federal rule, does not govern of its own force,"
(1931), and Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902).
12 Board

of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1939).

," E.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943).
Id.

'2United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305-06 (1947) (relationship between
a soldier and the federal government).
" E.g., United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592 (1973). Unless
used to refer to a specific federal program, the term "program" is used in this comment to
encompass all activities of the Government which fall within the concept of federal function.
The adoption issue usually arises in the context of a specific federal program, but more
general federal matters also give rise to adoption questions, e.g., the government-soldier
relationship in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947). However, the analysis
involved in either case is the same.
"7Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332
U.S. 301, 309-10 (1947); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943);
United States v. Chappell Livestock Auction, Inc., 523 F.2d 840, 841 (8th Cir. 1975); Mishkin,
supra note 3, at 799.
"1 The laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the
United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules
of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.
Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970); see United States v. Little
Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592-93 (1973); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315
U.S. 447, 465-75 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Although the Erie doctrine and the Rules of Decision Act are closely related, the Act may
have a broader reach than the Erie principle. While it has been argued that Erie applies
outside the context of diversity jurisdiction, see Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66
HARv.L. REv. 1013, 1031-36 (1953), it has generally been limited to diversity situations. See
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 465-68, 471-72 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring); C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 241-53 (2d ed. 1970). The Rules of Decision
Act is relevant outside the diversity area. See Note, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Suits,
69 YALE L.J. 1428, 1431 (1960). It has also been suggested that although Erie interpreted the
Rules of Decision Act, the decision in Erie might not completely coincide with all the dictates
of the Act. See Note, Clearfield: Clouded Field of Federal Common Law, 53 COLUM. L. REv.
991, 993-95 (1953).
" See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947); Clearfield Trust Co.
v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S.
173, 176 (1942). The source of the law, not the statutory basis for federal jurisdiction, determines the nature of the governing rule. Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173,
176 (1942) (diversity case in which a federal source of law necessitated a federal rule).
20 See Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1959); P. BATOR,
P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 768
(2d ed. 1973); Hart, The Relations between State and FederalLaw, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489,
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but only by virtue of its incorporation as the federal law. Erie can
be interpreted as holding that where state law governs an issue of
its own force, it is to be applied regardless of the forum in which the
issue is litigated.21 Where the source of law is federal, state law does
not govern of its own force, and Erie is therefore inapposite. 2 The
rationale for holding that the Rules of Decision Act's command to
use state law does not apply is similar: when the source of law is
otherwise than
federal, Congress or the Constitution "'require[s]'
23
that state law [should] govern of its own force.
The second prerequisite for reaching the adoption issue is that
Congress must not have determined the choice of law issue, 24 either
by dictating the use of state or federal law25 or by providing the
specific substantive law to be followed. 2 Taken together, these two
prerequisites27 set the stage for the adoption choice by requiring the
529 (1954). Since the resulting rule is federal, it will be binding on the states as federal law.
See Cullison, State Courts, State Law, and ConcurrentJurisdictionof FederalQuestions, 48
IOWA L. REv. 230, 235 (1963); Hart, supra, at 507; Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal
Courts: ConstitutionalPreemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1073-74 (1967). For discussion
of the problems of ascertaining state law in federal courts and federal law in state courts, see
text and notes at notes 33-34 infra.
21 Mishkin, supra note 3, at 798-800.
22 See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309-10 (1947); Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943); United States v. Chappell Livestock
Auction, Inc., 523 F.2d 840, 841 (8th Cir. 1975); Mishkin, supra note 3, at 799-800. The fact
that Erie is not applicable to the adoption issue affects both the methods by which state law
is adopted and the effect adoption has on other courts. See Mishkin, supra note 3, at 802-10;
Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to FormulateRules of Decision, 77 HAuv. L. REV.
1084, 1099 (1964). One commentator has stated that the Erie decision itself, by leaving to
the states the areas of law where they should exercise authority, led to the development of
areas, such as those connected with the adoption issue, in which state law is not mandated.
Friendly, supra note 3, at 405-12.
1 United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592-93 (1973); see
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 465-75 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring); Note,
The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1084,
1095-96 (1964); 49 N.C.L. REV. 358, 360-61 (1971). For criticism of this approach as applied
in the early adoption cases, on the ground that the mere federal source of law is insufficient
to invoke exceptions to the Rules of Decision Act, see Note, Clearfield: Clouded Field of
Federal Common Law, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 997-1008 (1953). For alternative constructions
of the application of the Rules of Decision Act, emphasizing a restrictive approach to judicial
creation of uniform federal law, see Mishkin, supra note 3, at 814 n.64; Note, Rules of Decision
in Nondiversity Suits, 69 YALE L.J. 1428, 1449 (1960); 49 N.C.L. REV. 358, 365-66 (1971).
21 See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943); Board of
County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349 (1939). See also Moor v. County of
Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 701-02 n.12 (1973). Legislative nonspecification may, of course, indicate either that Congress was oblivious to the possible problem, or that it did not consider
the state and federal interests involved sufficiently strong to merit congressional concern.
21 United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973).
21 Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349 (1939).
21 In considering the prerequisites for the adoption issue, it should be noted that it is not
necessary for the Government to be a party to the suit. See Mishkin, supra note 3, at 801
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courts to fashion a federal rule while leaving them free from any
2
mandate to base that rule on either federal or state law. 8
B.

Consequences of Choosing to Adopt State Law

The result of adopting state law as the content of a federal rule
is that when the same issue arises in other states, the laws of those
states will provide the basis for decision. 29 Thus a variety of state
laws will be used, each law serving as the content of the federal rule
in its own forum.3 If a state law should change after being adopted
n.19. Suits between private parties have given rise to the adoption issue when the activity
involved in the litigation was governed by a federal statute. E.g., Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
However, where the Government is a party, there is a greater likelihoood that a federal
function will be involved and therefore that an adoption issue will arise. See United States
v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592-93 (1973).
It should also be noted that the possibility of adoption may arise in both diversity and
nondiversity cases. Dumbauld, The Clear Field of Clearfield, 61 DICK. L. REV. 299, 301 (1957);
see, e.g., Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966) (diversity case); Sola Elec.
Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S.'173 (1942) (diversity case); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (nondiversity case).
1 The adoption doctrine involves several considerations similar to the preemption doctrine. Preemption analysis seeks to determine whether Congress has indicated an intent to
occupy the area of law in question; if it has, or if simultaneous operation of state law would
create a conflict with federal law, the state law is displaced. See generally Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
623 (1975). Adoption is also concerned with congressional intent and federal-state conflict,
but the adoption issue arises not when there are both state and federal laws on the issue in
question, but when a state law of general applicability is considered as a means of determining an issue on which Congress is silent. While the presence of congressional intent to occupy
the area of law is one ground for preemption, the absence of any congressional intent is one
of the prerequisites for the existence of the adoption issue. The effect of a conflict in the
preemption context is that the federal law prevails under the supremacy clause, and the state
law is therefore superseded; conflict in the adoption context means merely that otherwise
valid state law will not apply to resolve the particular federal law issue. Compare, e.g.,
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distilling Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951) (preemption), with United
States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973) (nonadoption). There have been
some parallel developments in these two doctrines, however. Recent preemption cases exhibit
tendencies similar to those in some adoption decisions. Greater recognition has been accorded
state interests absent express congressional concern, "trivial" conflicts have not served to
nullify state laws, and courts have become less inclined to find overwhelming national interests in particular policies. See Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on
Federalism and the Burger Court, supra, at 642, 647, 653. See also Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975) (preemption-type
analysis used to determine the existence of a federal source of law).
2-See United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 356-57 (1966); Mishkin, supra note 3, at 802.
In each case, the state law adopted must not conflict with the interests of the federal program.
See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 594-96 (1973); De Sylva v.
Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-81 (1956).
"I The effect of adoption may resemble the result under Erie or the Rules of Decision Act;
yet there are important differences between these latter grounds for recourse to state law and
adoption. As Professor Mishkin notes, state law is adopted only with reference to particular
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to resolve a particular issue, the new law will generally be employed
as the content of the governing federal rule in the particular state.3 '
The diversity of state laws and the need to define the federal
rule by reference to the law of each forum state give rise to several
problems. If two or more states are involved in the activity under
litigation, a court must decide which state's law applies. In the
adoption context, commentators have argued that Erie and its progeny do not control the determination of this issue and that courts
are therefore free to develop federal choice of law principles.12 Another problem created by a decision to adopt state law is that federal
courts must ascertain the relevant state law.3 3 However, this is a
familiar task for federal courts, since they frequently are required
to identify state law in such contexts as diversity litigation. Any
difficulties in determining the state law for adbption purposes are
susceptible to resolution by methods similar to those used in other
contexts. 3
issues, while under the Erie doctrine state law must govern the entire litigation (absent a
federal question). Second, only state law that does not conflict with the goals of the federal
program can be adopted, while under Erie, valid state law is applicable without reference to
its content. Mishkin, supra note 3, at 804-06. The Supreme Court seems to have accepted
Mishkin's general rationale and to have reached the result he suggested for cases involving
conflict between a state's law and a federal program. See United States v. Little Lake Misere
Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973).
11See United States v. Big Z Warehouse, 311 F. Supp. 283, 286 (S.D. Ga. 1970). Again,
however, the changed state law must not be considered aberrant or hostile, that is, in conflict
with the interests of the federal program.
11In the adoption context, the inapplicability of Erie means that the principle, announced in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941), that Erie requires
federal courts to use the conflicts of laws rules of the forum state, does not apply. Since the
law to be fashioned is federal, courts should be free to develop their own principles for
choosing between state laws. See Hart, supra note 20, at 536; Mishkin, supra note 3, at 80608. See generally Note, Applicability of State Conflicts Rules when Issues of State Law Arise
in FederalQuestion Cases, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1955). For a suggested approach to developing choice of law principles for adoption, see Mishkin, supra note 3, at 806-08.
" Since state courts have concurrent jurisdiction of the major heads of federal jurisdiction, see Cullison, supra note 20, at 240; Hart, supra note 20, at 533, and since subsidiary
federal issues may be involved in state-created claims, see Hart, supra note 20, at 537,
adoption might also require state courts to ascertain federal law relevant to the question of
whether state law should be adopted. In such cases, the applicable federal law, however
developed, is binding on state courts. See note 20 supra. For a suggested approach to this
problem see Comment, The State Courts and the Federal Common Law, 27 ALBANY L. REV.
73 (1963).
31 See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Note, Federal
Interpretationof State Law-An Argument for Expanded Scope of Inquiry, 53 MINN. L. REV.
806 (1969). One difference between problems of ascertaining state law under Erie and under
adoption is that once it is clear that state law governs under Erie, the state law must be
determined, despite the difficulties involved (or prophecy required). In contrast, although
the content of existing state law is relevant in every adoption case, since this content must
be known in order to determine whether there is a conflict with the operation of the federal
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Rationale of the Adoption Option

Allowing courts the option to adopt state law as the content of
a federal rule comports with both the realities of federal action and
the coordinate existence of state and federal law. The federal system
of government does not seek a comprehensive, nationally uniform
body of law. The recognized value of permitting local and possibly
diverse solutions to the problems of regulating conduct" is reflected
in the considerable latitude allowed states in ordering the affairs of
their citizens." State law plays a significant role even in areas for
which federal law has been developed. 37 Federal regulation is often
interstitial in nature, enacted against a background of state law and
building on state law relationships.3 8 When used in conjunction with
this interstitial federal law, state law provides a vehicle for effectuating the federal law and integrating it into the rules of conduct
39
already governing in various localities.
Whenever the prerequisites for reaching the adoption issue are
present, there exist both a federal interest in effectively implementing the federal program and a state interest in preserving existing
state regulation of the area in which the federal action takes place.
Neither of these interests in the abstract has been held legally sufficient to mandate recourse exclusively to either state or federal law.
While the involvement of a substantial federal governmental function determines that the source of the applicable law will be federal,
it does not dictate automatic use of a uniform federal law." State
law does not govern of its own force where the source of law is federal
and therefore will not necessarily be applied. The refusal of the
courts to mandate exclusive use of federal or state law in the adoption context indicates a recognition of the desirability of accommodating state and federal interests. Achieving this accommodation
thus appears to be the general purpose of the adoption option. This
purpose suggests that the essence of a proper test to determine
whether to adopt state law is a balancing of the impact on state
program, a finding that state law does not exist on the issue or is not easily determinable
may be sufficient to preclude adoption. In such situations, the state interest in avoiding
dislocations to state activities is not present and no convenient source of decision is provided,
so the purposes of adoption would not be served by adopting state law.
See Hart, supra note 20, at 539-42.
3' Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
See Hart, supra note 20, at 525-35; Mishkin, supra note 3, at 810-11.
Hart, supra note 20, at 525, 535; Mishkin, supra note 3, at 811; Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the
National Government, 54 COLUM. L. Rpv, 543, 544-45 (1954).
:' Hart, supra note 20, at 534-35, 542.
IC United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592-94 (1973).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[43:823

interests resulting from federal displacement of state law against
the degree to which adopting state law would affect operation of the
federal program.4 ' This balancing approach must, however, be qualified by the fundamental purpose of the adoption option: providing
a means to implement programs of the federal government.2 Thus
a direct conflict between the state law in question and the operations of the federal program must preclude adoption of state law.43
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE MAJOR CRITERIA

Courts have developed three major criteria for determining
whether state law should be adopted: the need for uniformity in
operating the federal program, the presence of an area of traditionally local concern, and the existence of conflict between the state
law and the federal program. When a court discovers a conflict
between the state law and the federal program, this often proves
conclusive. Absent a conflict, courts generally balance the state and
federal interests represented by the other two criteria either by expressly weighing these interests or by implicitly doing so through
evaluating only one of these criteria and finding it determinative in
the particular case. An examination of three major cases dealing
with the adoption issue-Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 4 .
United States v. Standard Oil Co.," 5 and United States v. Little
Lake Misere Land Co. "-illustrates the content of the three criteria
and their roles in a court's determination whether to adopt state
law.
The substantive issue in Clearfield47 was whether the defense of
laches could defeat a claim by the United States against a trust
company which had collected on a fraudulently endorsed Works
Progress Administration paycheck. The check had not reached the
person to whom it was issued but had been endorsed and cashed by
an unknown individual. Ultimately Clearfield Trust collected on the
check from a Federal Reserve Bank. Although agents of the United
" See United States v. View Crest Garden Apts., Inc., 268 F.2d 380, 383 (9th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959).
42 See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 594-601 (1973); United
States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309-11 (1947).
" See, e.g., RFC v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 208, 210 (1946). The supremacy clause
might require this result. See United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 182-83
(1944).
" 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
45332 U.S. 301 (1947).
46 412 U.S. 580 (1973).
4 318 U.S. 363 (1943). For further discussion of Clearfield, see Dumbauld, supra note
27; 43 COLUM. L. REv. 520 (1943); 75 HARV. L. REV. 1656 (1962); 18 IND. L.J. 311 (1943).
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States had almost immediate knowledge that the check had not
been received by the proper party, the Government did not notify
Clearfield Trust promptly about the forgery and procrastinated in
requesting reimbursement. Eventually, the United States sued
Clearfield Trust on its express guaranty of prior endorsements to
recover the amount of the check.
The Supreme Court found that the source of the law governing
the cause of action was federal because the check had been issued
by the Government for services performed under a federal statute."
The issue then became whether to use a uniform federal law or to
adopt state law, under which the Government's unreasonable delay
in giving notice would have been a defense for Clearfield Trust.
Noting that the United States used commercial paper on a vast
scale and often in transactions conducted in several states,49 the
Court concluded that adopting state law would lead to undue diversity and uncertainty in determining the rights and duties of the
Government in such transactions."0 The need for uniformity of result
in order to ease administration of the federal program was found to
justify the use of a uniform federal law.
The Court's reliance on the alleged need for uniformity has
been heavily criticized. 51 Both the specific holding of Clearfield and
its strong emphasis on uniformity for administrative ease have been
limited by later Supreme Court decisions.12 The enduring imporClearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943).
The existence of these multistate transactions raised the prospect, considered undesirable by the Court, that the adoption of state law might generate conflict of laws issues. Id.
at 367.
"

'

'Id.

These criticisms generally emphasize that uniformity was not necessary to prevent
significant impairment of the federal program and that the uniformity argument therefore
served primarily to provide the Government with an unwarranted edge in litigation to which
it is a party. See Mishkin, supra note 3, at 828-32; Note, The FederalCommon Law, 82 HARv.
L. REv. 1512, 1529-31 (1969). The uniformity argument utilized in Clearfield seems to be
essentially an ease of administration argument: the Court appeared to be concerned with
administrative difficulties and never suggested that there was a direct conflict between the
use of state law and the continued issuance of commercial paper. The diversity of results
which would ensue would not appear sufficiently serious to conflict with the continued federal
use of commercial paper. Indeed, it has been emphasized that large corporations face, and
cope with, similar problems of diversity in their commercial practices. See Note, The Federal
Common Law, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1512, 1530 (1969). But see 18 U. Pinr. L. REv. 820, 823 (1957)
(suggesting that the federal activity might have been significantly affected by diverse results,
since uncertainty might have impaired the negotiability of commercial paper).
52 The general holding that suits involving federal commercial paper would be
determined by uniform federal law was limited in Bank of America v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29
(1956), which held that suits among private parties involving federal commercial paper would
be governed by state law since the utilization of state law in such circumstances did not have
a direct adverse effect on the rights and duties of the United States. See Dumbauld, supra
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tance of Clearfield lies in its specific recognition of the possibility
of adopting state law53 and in its reliance on uniformity as one
criterion to be considered in deciding whether to adopt state law. 4
In Standard Oil,"5 the Government sought to establish its right
to recover from one who had injured a serviceman the amount the
Government had spent on the victim's hospitalization and wages.
One issue in the case was whether the existence of this cause of
action would be determined by adopting state law or using a uniform federal law. The Supreme Court found a federal source for the
governing rule in the federal relationship existing between the Government and the soldier and further supported this finding by noting the involvement of federal fiscal powers in the litigation.
In determining whether to adopt state law as the content of the
federal rule, the Court first described several situations where adoption would be appropriate. First, adopting state law would be proper
when the Government has placed itself in a position where its rights
are necessarily determined by reference to state law, or when Congress has presumably consented to the use of state law by not providing otherwise in legislating for areas ordinarily governed by state
law.57 These two considerations can be seen as referring to the presence of areas of traditionally local concern as a criterion for adoption. 8 Second, state law might be adopted when it provides a convenient solution that is not inconsistent with adequately protecting
the federal interests involved. Finally, adopting state law may be
appropriate when adoption would not result in substantially diverse
note 27, at 310, 316-21; Mishkin, supra note 3, at 833. In addition, the strong reliance on
uniformity for ease of administration seems to have been limited by the growing tendency of
the Court to examine the need for uniformity more closely within the circumstances of the
particular case. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454(1975); United
States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 607 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., concurring);
UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
" State law had previously been adopted as providing the content for a federal rule in
Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941), and Board of County Comm'rs v.
United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939).
' See Mishkin, supra note 3, at 831-33.
'5 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947). For further discussion of the
Standard Oil case, see Lenhoff, On Interpretative Theories: A Comparative Study in
Legislation, 27 TEXAS L. REV. 312 (1949); Note, FederalPractice:The Rebirth of FederalLaw,
34 CORNELL L.Q. 110 (1948); 28 BOSTON U.L. REV. 83 (1948); 36 GEO. L.J. 89 (1947); 27 NEB.
L. REV. 461 (1947); 26 TExAS L. REV. 353 (1948).
56 332 U.S. 301, 305-06 (1947).
5 Id. at 308-09.
5' The Court used the example of title to real estate for the first consideration; for the
second, the Court cited RFC v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946), which adopted state law,
relying heavily on the fact that the area of law in question-real property law-had been
traditionally governed by state law.
332 U.S. 301, 309 (1947).
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treatment of an issue which should be treated uniformly."0 These
considerations suggest two additional criteria: the absence of a conflict between state law and federal interests, and the need for uniformity. The Court's review of these situations suggests that state
law is properly adopted when it would provide a convenient solution
and would not lead to inconsistencies or undesirable diversity.
In deciding the issue before it, however, the Court seemed to
reverse its emphasis and to demand more affirmative reasons for
adopting state law. The Court held that a uniform federal law
should govern in Standard Oil because there was no affirmative
justification for diversity of results, because the issue concerned did
not involve particularly local concerns, and because a uniform rule
was ordinarily more appropriate in handling federal fiscal matters."
The issue in Little Lake6 2 was whether state statutory law,
which provided a retroactive rule of imprescriptibility of mineral
rights, would be adopted to govern federal acquisitions of land in the
state under the Migratory Bird Conservation Act. 1 The contract
and condemnation judgment by which the United States had acquired the lands in question reserved mineral rights to the prior
owners under a ten-year rule of prescription. According to the reservation provisions, the mineral rights had vested in the Government;
but a state statute passed three years after the contract and a year
after the condemnation judgment provided that the rights reserved
in such situations would be imprescriptible.
Since the land acquisition arose from and was related to a federal regulatory program, the Court found that the source of the law
was federal.64 In considering the adoption issue the Court decided
against adopting state law in the case before it, but seemed to leave
open the possibility of adopting state law to resolve the same issue
in other states. Rather than holding that a uniform federal law must
be formulated to govern federal land acquisitions, the Court held
that even if state law might generally be adopted in connection with
these transactions, the particular state law at issue could not be
adopted because it was hostile to the interests of the federal program.65 The state statute was found to be hostile because it would
6o Id.
" Id. at 310-11.
62 United States v.

Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973). For further discussion of Little Lake, see Sachse, United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co.-A Choice of
Law, 34 LA. L. REV. 29 (1973); 59 A.B.A.J. 1441 (1973).
16 U.S.C. § 715-715s (1970).
1 412 U.S. 580, 592-94 (1973).
s Id. at 595-97; see De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 581 (1956); United States v.
Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1974).
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have conflicted with the purposes of the federal program by depriving the Government of its contractual interests and thereby creating
uncertainty in land transactions under the Act.6 Little Lake's focus
on the conflict criterion and its suggestion that even if the particular
state law in question conflicts with the federal program, other nonconflicting state laws might be adopted 7 may indicate a move away
from the strong emphasis on uniformity evident in Clearfield, and
to some degree in Standard Oil, and a departure from the presumption in favor of using uniform federal law which often accompanies
that emphasis.
Ill.

A

PROPOSED TEST FOR ADOPTION OF STATE LAW

The development of the three major criteria in these cases-the
need for uniformity in operating the federal program, the presence
of an area of traditionally local concern, and the existence of a
conflict between the state law and the federal program-demonstrates an attempt to specify the state and federal interests relevant to determining whether state law should be adopted.6 8 Courts,
however, seldom carefully analyze these criteria and have often
failed to apply them systematically in particular cases.6" Specific
aspects of the broad concepts embodied in each criterion are not
examined to identify those relevant to a given case.70 The weight
accorded to each major criterion and to the specific aspects of each
criterion involved in a particular case is seldom determined in light
of the purpose of the adoption option. Often courts seriously
examine only one criterion, thereby determining the result through
initial selection of which criterion is to be deemed significant in the
particular case.71
66

412 U.S. 580, 596-99 (1973).

11See

De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
" With the addition of the state interest in avoiding the general disruptive effects that
would be caused by using federal law to govern aspects of activities normally regulated by
state law, see p. 843 infra, these three criteria seem to represent the federal and state inter-

ests to be considered in determining whether state law should be adopted. The purpose of
the adoption option is to balance the state and federal interests affected in the context of
furthering a federal program. These three criteria represent the major direct effects on the
state and federal interests which would result if the option were or were not exercised.
11The Supreme Court has recently begun to analyze these criteria more thoroughly. See
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973) (conflict); UAW v. Hoosier
Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966) (uniformity). But failure to analyze the criteria remains
characteristic of the majority of circuit courts. The series of FmHA cases discussed in text
and notes at notes 133-74 infra illustrates this circuit court approach.
70 See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); cases cited notes
7, 8 supra.
71 See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); United States v.
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The failure to analyze the content and weight of the criteria and
to apply them systematically allows courts great discretion in deciding whether to adopt state law, a discretion uninformed by the
purpose of accommodating the state and federal interests involved
in the operation of a federal program. Decisions resulting from the
exercise of this discretion carry no assurance that a proper determination of whether state law should be adopted has been made. In
practice, this approach has frequently contributed to an unjustified
presumption in favor of a uniform federal law.72 Analyzing the content of each of the three major criteria and considering the weight
that should be attached to the general criteria and their specific
aspects in light of the purpose of the adoption option provides the
foundation necessary to design a more satisfactory approach to the
adoption question.
A.

The Conflict Criterion

Courts considering adoption issues have generally agreed that
a finding of conflict between applying state law and effectuating a
federal program will preclude the adoption of state law.7" The decisions indicate that a conflict exists when using state law would
virtually nullify a particular activity or purpose of the federal program involved. A conflict has been found when adopting state law
would have effectively terminated contractual interests obtained
under a federal program 74 or would have defeated the specific purpose for which the Government had entered into a transaction under
a federal program.75 Conflict also exists when adopting state law
would result in evading the dictates of a federal program. 76 A conHext, 444 F.2d 804, 808-09 (5th Cir. 1971); Cassidy Comm'n Co. v. United States, 387 F.2d
875, 878-79 (10th Cir. 1967). If the single criterion examined is the conflict criterion, and if a
conflict is found, the preeminent purpose of effectuating the federal program would support
rejecting state law without considering other criteria. In any other situation, the policy of
accommodating state and federal interests requires that the interests represented by all the
other criteria be considered and weighed.
72 E.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); see note 51 supra.
See Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966); RFC v. Beaver County,
328 U.S. 204 (1946); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942); Royal Indem.
Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941).
11 United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973); see United States
v. Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1974).
7 United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
7, This notion shades into an argument of discrimination against the federal government
as an alternative ground for holding that state law is inapplicable. Such an argument was
made by Justice Rehnquist in his concurring opinion in Little Lake. 412 U.S. at 606. The
majority did not discuss this argument, but seemed to suggest that if legitimate state interests
opposed to those of the federal government were present, the state law would not be automati-
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flict has been found, for example, when adopting state law would
have allowed persons to avoid the liability imposed by a federal
law was primarily designed to thwart
statute" and when the state
78
action.
of
cause
a federal
Courts occasionally use other terminology to express the conflict concept. In some cases, particularly when the area of law in
question has been one of traditionally local concern, courts have
refused to adopt state law they found "aberrant or hostile. ' 79 This
standard seems functionally equivalent to the conflict criterion."
The heart of the "hostility" test as applied to the particular state
law involved is an examination of possible conflicts with federal
interests;" the test for aberrance may reflect the assumption that
the farther a state law moves away from a generally accepted law,
the greater the potential for conflict with the interests of the federal
program becomes.8"
Some cases have defined the standard for adoption of state law
in terms of "inconsistency" with the interests of the federal procally disqualified on discrimination grounds and that such a situation would be more properly
analyzed in terms of the conflict criterion. Id. at 599-601. Justice Rehnquist's discrimination
argument seems to be limited to state statutes actually directed against particular activities
of the federal government, while the conflict criterion is used to analyze state laws effecting
the evasion of liabilities under federal statutes. See Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317
U.S. 173 (1942); Edgerton v. Puckett, 391 F. Supp. 463 (W.D. Va. 1975).
Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
7 Edgerton v. Puckett, 391 F. Supp. 463 (W.D. Va. 1975).
" E.g., United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973); see De Sylva
v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
" See, e.g., United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973). In
determining not to adopt an "aberrant or hostile" state law, the Court used the terms "hostile" and "conflicting" as functional equivalents. Rather than defining a distinct notion of
hostility or comparing the law in question with other state laws to determine aberrancy, the
Court emphasized the harm to the federal program which would result from the plain discordance between the law and the federal program. Id. at 597, 604. While the Court thus used a
conflict standard in dealing with the specific state law in question, its use of the phrase
"aberrant or hostile" could be viewed as preserving the possibility that in future cases involving the same issue the laws of other states could be adopted. See also United States v.
Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1974).
11See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973); United States
v. Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. O'Connell, 496 F.2d 1329 (2d Cir.
1974).
sZ See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 581 (1956), where the Court emphasized the
possibility of disqualifying a particular state's law that defines a relationship in "a way
entirely strange to those familiar with its ordinary usage." Id. at 581. For, as the state usage
becomes more unusual, the possibility that it would conflict with the purpose of the federal
program becomes larger. See id. at 582. This does not, of course, mean that an unusual law
should be disqualified for adoption; divergence from the norm merely suggests the possibility
of conflict.
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gram.83 The cQncept of inconsistency has not been developed since
the facts involved in the major cases relying on this standard were
found to present no inconsistency. 4 The use of the terms "conflict"
and "inconsistency" by the courts has been imprecise, and no significance has been attached to this difference in terminology. 5 Further, the Supreme Court's analysis in Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc.," affirmatively supports the conclusion that "inconsistent" and "conflicting" describe the same standard. In that case
the issue was whether to adopt a short (one-year) state statute of
limitations for section 1981 of title 42 of the United States Code,
which, inter alia, creates a cause of action against racially discriminatory contract requirements. The Court acknowledged that
adopting the state law could detrimentally affect the federal legislative scheme, but chose to use the state law because no actual conflict was discovered. 8 In the opinion the Court spoke of the state law
as both not "inconsistent" and not in "conflict" with the federal
plan.89 The definition of the term conflict," the use of precedent,"
and the result reached 2 indicate adherence to a conflict standard.
A finding of conflict precludes the adoption of state law93 despite the weight of any of the other criteria involved in considering
whether to exercise the adoption option." This result is consonant
with the purpose of the option to adopt state law. Since the fundamental purpose of the adoption option is to provide a means for
implementing federal governmental programs, state law which di"
See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947); Board of County
Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939).
" See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939).
See United States v. National Capital Storage & Moving Co., 265 F. Supp. 50 (D. Md.
1967). The view that "inconsistency" and "conflict" express the same standard seems to be
the best approach, particularly since the two terms are used interchangeably and cases using
these different terms are cited together for the same proposition. See id.
- 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
R 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
U 421 U.S. 454, 465-67.

"

Id.

"

Conflict was used to mean direct contradiction of the purposes of the federal statute.

Id.
" The Court's citation to UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966), may
imply that conflict and inconsistency are synonymous, since the references in Hoosier phrased
the standard in terms of conflict. E.g., RFC v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946).
11The Court adopted state law even though it explicitly recognized the significant detrimental effect of adoption on the federal cause of action. This result suggests that the inconsistency standard applied by the Court required no less interference than a conflict standard.
13E.g., United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973); Sola Elec.
Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
11See RFC v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946).
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rectly conflicts with a particular aspect or purpose of the federal
program should not qualify for adoption. Furthermore, the purpose
of the supremacy clause, resolving conflicts between federal and
state law when the federal government is acting pursuant to statutory or constitutional authority, also requires precluding the adoption of state law where that law would conflict with effectuating the
federal program. 5
Adoption of state law should also be precluded by a finding of
inconsistency with the federal program, if "inconsistency" is merely
another word for conflict. But if the term "inconsistent" refers to a
degree of interference with the federal interests less than a direct
negation of particular purposes of the federal program, inconsistency should not automatically prevent adoption. This result is consistent with the purpose of the adoption option. Accommodation of
state and federal interests might still be achieved by adopting state
law, even though that law may produce some ill effects; and the
state law may provide an adequate, though not ideal, method of
implementing the federal program. While the federal interest in
avoiding interference not amounting to a conflict should not automatically preclude adoption, avoiding such interference is an important interest and therefore should be weighed with the other
criteria to determine whether state law should be adopted.
This discussion of the conflict criterion suggests that a court
facing the adoption issue should .first consider whether applying
state law would conflict with the federal program involved. If a
conflict, as defined by the case law, would be created, adoption of
state law should be precluded. If no such conflict is found, the court
should move to a second stage of analysis where other federal interests, including the interest in avoiding interference not amounting
to a conflict, should be weighed against state interests to determine
the adoption issue. The bifurcated approach clarifies the analysis of
the adoption issue by emphasizing the preclusive effect of the existence of a conflict and by avoiding the confusion generated by undifferentiated consideration of the three major criteria.
See United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 182-83 (1944).
, See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975). By analogy to the
supremacy clause, it could also be argued that there is no constitutional reason to disqualify
a state rule for adoption unless a conflict exists. Cf. United States v. County of Allegheny,
322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944).
'" Considering the three factors together tends to conceal the importance accorded to the
conflict criterion and to add unnecessary complexities and exceptions to analysis of the
adoption issue. See, e.g., RFC v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946). Judicial emphasis on
conflict as the major criterion and an increasingly detailed analysis of situations in which the
'5
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The Uniformity Criterion

B.

Courts dealing with the adoption issue have frequently invoked
need for uniformity arguments but have seldom isolated or evaluated the various interests embodied in the general concept of uniformity. 8 The weight accorded to arguments for uniformity often
seems to depend more on a court's predisposition toward adopting
state law than on an examination of the need for uniformity in a
particular case. 9 To clarify the proper significance of the uniformity
arguments in adoption cases, it is necessary to catalogue the major
interests underlying the uniformity criterion ' and to consider what
weight should be allotted to each interest in adoption analysis.
In some opinions, the argument for uniformity seems to express
no more than a desire to achieve uniformity for uniformity's sake.'0 '
This desire does not represent a federal interest involved in implementing a federal program and therefore does not deserve weight in
the balancing process.' °2 Furthermore, insofar as this argument for
uniformity reflects an abstract desire for symmetry in the law from
a federal perspective, it is inconsistent with the principles of federalism underlying the adoption option.' 3
Uniformity is often sought to ease the burden of federal administration.'0 4 Large-scale federal programs are simpler and less expenconflict issue arises also support explicitly recognizing the impact of conflict through a twostep analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973);
UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
' See Note, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Suits, 69 YALE L.J. 1428, 1438 (1960).
Recent cases exhibit more careful analysis of the uniformity criterion. See, e.g., UAW v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966). See also note 113 infra.
" See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); St. Petersburg
Bank & Trust Co. v. Boutin, 445 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1971) (Small Business Administration);
United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 438 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Merrick Sponsor Corp., 421 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1970) (Federal Housing Administration). See
generally Mishkin, supra note 3, at 813-14.
"' See generally Mishkin, supra note 3, at 813-14; Note, The Federal Common Law, 82
HARv. L. REv. 1512, 1529-31 (1969); Note, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Suits, 69 YALE
L.J. 1428, 1438 (1960).
"I2See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 310 (1947); Royal Indem. Co. v.
United States, 313 U.S. 289, 297-98 (1941) (Black, J., dissenting); Mishkin, supra note 3, at
813; Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1512, 1531 (1969).
202

See Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HA9v. L. REv. 1512, 1531 (1969).

See Mishkin, supra note 3, at 813-14; text and notes at notes 35-39 supra.
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), can be viewed as advancing
the uniformity argument in terms of ease of administration. See note 51 supra. See also
United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237, 260-61 (1960) (Clark, J., dissenting); United States
v. National Bank of Commerce, 438 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1971); Clark Inv. Co. v. United States,
364 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1966); Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1530
(1969); Note, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Suits, 69 YALE L.J. 1428, 1438 (1960); cf.
Bumb v. United States, 276 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1960).
"3

26
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sive to administer if they operate identically in every state. Although ease of administration is presumably a relevant federal interest in all federal programs, the weight due this interest may vary
considerably among particular programs. The purpose behind the
adoption option-furthering the goals of the federal program while
attempting to accommodate state and federal interests-therefore
requires that the administrative problems involved in each case be
specifically determined and balanced with the other federal and
state interests in the adoption calculus. A generalized desire for ease
of federal administration, without a determination that disuniformity would significantly undermine the functioning of the specific
program involved, 15 should not outweigh important state interests
in the balancing process." 6
It has also been argued that in some cases uniformity is necessary to avoid a conflict with the interests of a given federal program." 7 This rationale for seeking uniformity involves considerations similar to those discussed in relation to the conflict criterion.
If the mere diversity of state laws would create an interference
amounting to a conflict, the ultimate purpose of the adoption option
-implementing the federal program-would justify precluding the
use of state law. However, the mere presence of disuniformity has
seldom been found to result in a conflict with a federal program.'
The potential for finding such conflict is higher in certain areas of
115It is possible that the use of diverse state laws, by imposing huge administration costs,
could impair operation of a federal program so seriously as to amount to a conflict with the
interests of the federal program. See text and note at note 107 infra.
" See Note, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Suits, 69 YALE L.J. 1428, 1447-48 (1960).
Aside from Clearfield, the Supreme Court has not accorded much weight to the uniformity
for administrative ease argument. It has not figured importantly in recent cases, and the
Court's adoption of state law in United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237 (1960), can be viewed
as a rejection of the ease of administration argument in that case.
"' See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 583-84 (1956) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Justice Douglas urged that uniformity was necessary to further the policy of protecting dependents. Although Douglas's argument also seems to involve considerations of the content of
the state laws, it is possible that he viewed a uniform rule itself as allowing more protection
to dependents. In O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F.2d 539 (1st Cir. 1940), uniformity
was considered necessary to avoid the burden on interstate commerce which would result
from using different state laws and also the burden which would result from the particular
content of these laws. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), has also
been viewed as considering uniformity in terms of possible impairment of federal activity.
See 18 U. Prr. L. REv. 820, 823 (1957).
"OS
Conflict resulting from disuniformity is analytically distinguishable from other types
of conflict in that it arises from the mere diversity of results under state law rather than from
the particular content of the state law involved. Grounds for this special form of the uniformity argument would seem to be rare. Even De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956), and
O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F.2d 539 (1st Cir. 1940), appear to involve a mixture
of uniformity to avoid conflict and more traditional conflict arguments.
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federal legislation, such as labor relations' 9 and civil rights,"10 which
are informed by a strong policy favoring uniform standards. In such
areas, lack of uniformity in itself may be viewed as detrimental."'
Even in these areas, however, adoption should not be precluded
unless disuniform rules or results in connection with the particular
issue involved would conflict with effective implementation of the
federal program." 2
A general pattern for evaluating uniformity arguments emerges
from the above discussion."' When, as in the argument for uniformity for uniformity's sake and in a generalized argument for ease of
administration, the interest in uniformity is not specifically related
to the operations of the federal program involved, a uniformity argument deserves little or no weight in the adoption calculus. When a
lack of uniformity would actually interfere with the functioning of
a specific federal program, as may be the case with a uniformity for
administrative ease argument, the interest in uniformity deserves
weight according to the amount of interference. When the disuniformity caused by adoption would lead to a conflict with the federal
program, adopting state law should be precluded.
It is important to note that the term "uniformity" as used by
the courts and as analyzed above refers to uniformity as viewed
exclusively from the federal perspective. When federal law is used
to obtain uniform resolution of issues substantially related to federal
functions, there will often be a corresponding loss of uniformity in
state regulation and in the activities of those who deal both with the
Government and with private entities.' The disruption resulting
from displacing state law in an area ordinarily governed by such law
See, e.g., UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
See, e.g., Marr v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1974).
"' See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701-02 (1966).
"' In UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966), the Supreme Court recognized the importance of a uniform federal labor policy. However, careful analysis led the
Court to conclude that lack of uniformity on the issue in the litigation (determining the
statute of limitations) would be "unlikely to frustrate" the federal policy, and therefore state
law could be adopted. Id. at 702. See generally Acheson v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 523 F.2d
1327 (9th Cir. 1975).
"I There seems to be a tendency developing in the cases to accord less importance to
the uniformity criterion. Some courts have expressed hesitancy in finding a need for uniformity that will justify the utilization of federal law. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975). CompareUnited States v. MacKenzie, 510 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1975),
with Branden v. Driver, 441 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1971), and United States v. Stadium Apts.,
Inc., 425 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970). Other courts have
demonstrated an increasing willingness to focus on and discuss the particular purposes uniformity is intended to serve in the federal activities. See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,
383 U.S. 696 (1966).
"I See Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1512, 1531 (1969).
"°
11
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may be considerable. In balancing the state and federal interests,
the effects of both the new uniformity and the new disuniformity
created by formulating a uniform federal law should be considered.
C.

The Local Interest Criterion

The great majority of courts considering adoption of state law
have accorded significant weight to only one state interest: a tradition of local control over the area of law in which the adoption
question arises. The principal areas"5 deemed to be of traditionally
local concern are domestic relations"6 and real property transactions." 7 The emphasis given to the involvement of such areas in
adoption cases ' 8 can facilitate both the accommodation of state and
federal interests and the implementation of federal programs.
States have generally developed detailed laws governing relationships in these areas, and the relationships are enduring ones. To
impose federal law on specific aspects of an area traditionally governed by state law would be likely to cause a significant disruption
in the scheme of state regulation.' 9 Preventing such a large disruption of state regulation is an important state interest involved in the
implementation of a federal program. This state interest is therefore
justifiably accorded weight in the adoption calculus to the extent
that use of a uniform federal law would actually disrupt state regulation. Furthermore, there is usually no large or detailed body of
federal law developed for these areas, particularly in the field of
domestic relations. Using state law in such situations provides a
I's It has been suggested that the area of trusts and estates might also qualify as an area
of primary state control. Blaney v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 357 F.2d 27, 30-31 (5th Cir. 1966). It
has also been suggested that in determining whether an action involves an area of traditionally local concern, the origin of the claim being litigated should be examined. See Comment,
Erie Limited: The Confines of State Law in the Federal Courts,40 CORNELL L.Q. 561, 576-78
(1955).
,,'
United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966); De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570
(1956); see Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964); Sitton v. United States, 413 F.2d 1386
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 988 (1970).
"' United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237 (1960); RFC v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204
(1946); see Ideco Div. v. Chance Drilling Co., 422 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970).
"1The weight accorded to the presence of such an area of traditionally local concern has
been found to outweigh the need for uniformity, see United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237
(1960); De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956), but not to overcome the preclusive effect
of a finding of conflict between the state law and the interests of the federal program. See
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973); RFC v. Beaver County,
328 U.S. 204 (1946).
,,'
The disruption of state activities and established relationships has been viewed as the
major rationale for the importance accorded the presence of an area of traditionally local
concern. See United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352-53 (1966); United States v. Brosnan,
363 U.S. 237, 241-42 (1960).
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convenient rule of decision,' 0 thus serving an affirmative purpose of
the adoption option.
The state interest in avoiding disruptive effects on state activities outside the areas of traditionally local concern has not usually
been considered in the adoption calculus.' 2 The policy of accommodating state and federal interests would seem to require, however,
that disruptive effects on state regulation in all areas be taken into
account. The major rationale used by the courts to justify the weight
accorded to the existence of an area of traditionally local concern
-preventing large dislocations within areas of existing state
regulation-also provides a basis for considering more general disruptive effects on state activities outside the limited areas now examined. Avoiding these general disruptive effects is a state interest
directly affected by the law applied in connection with the federal
program. This state interest stands as the counterpart of the federal
interest in uniformity. In accord with the purpose of the adoption
option, this state interest should be examined in the adoption balance and weighed according to the degree of disruption presented
by the facts of each case.
D.

Evaluation of the Proposed Test

The above analysis of the three major criteria in light of the
purpose of the adoption option suggests the following two-stage process for determining whether to adopt state law.' 2 First, a court
should determine whether there is a conflict between the state law
and the federal program. If a conflict is found, adoption of state law
should be precluded. Second, if no conflict exists, the state and
federal interests involved should be balanced. The federal interests
to be considered at the second stage are the need for uniformity and
1' See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956). Another explanation for the
respect accorded to the presence of areas of traditionally local control is that since these areas
are ones in which state law has normally governed, Congress's failure to specify the applicable
law in legislation concerning such areas indicates an intent that state law should continue to
govern. See United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237, 241-42 (1960); United States v. Standard
Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 308-09 (1947).
,"I
Some recent cases do suggest that state interests other than those connected with
traditionally local control be considered in determining whether to adopt state law. See
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 599-603 (1973); United States v.
MacKenzie, 510 F.2d 39, 41-42 (9th Cir. 1975).
"I The proposed test is aimed at clarifying and modifying the existing mechanism for
determining whether to adopt state law. The bifurcated procedure clarifies the determinative
role of the conflict criterion, a role often apparent in the cases. See text and notes at notes
73, 93 supra. The test also modifies the weight and elements of the other two criteria. A few
recent cases have suggested modifications similar to those used in the proposed test. See notes
113, 121 supra.
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the avoidance of interference, not amounting to a conflict, with a
federal program. The relevant state interests are preserving the
structure of state regulation in areas of traditionally local concern
and avoiding disruptive effects on the operation of state law in other
areas.
This proposed test is an improvement over traditional formulations in that it explicitly recognizes the importance of the conflict
criterion and defines its proper scope, eliminates the overemphasis
on a generalized need for uniformity argument, and recognizes a
broader range of valid state concerns in the balancing process. The
content of the proposed standard-the factors chosen for analysis
and the weight accorded them-and the procedure suggestedbifurcation and balancing-are justified in terms of the purpose of
the adoption option and are designed to yield results consonant
with that purpose.
Objections might be raised to the proposed test, and particularly to its balancing phase, on the grounds that it fails to prescribe
a sufficiently specific mechanism for decision and that it allows
subjective determination of the adoption question. 2' 3 An examination of the proposed test indicates, however, that it does provide
some checks on the potential for subjective determination. While
elements of subjectivity are not completely eliminated, some degree
of indefiniteness appears inevitable if state and federal interests are
1 24
to be accommodated.
The first stage of the proposed test, ascertaining whether there
is a conflict between a state law and a federal program, does not
pose great problems of subjectivity or indefiniteness. Courts have
evolved procedures for determining the purposes of federal pro'2 These objections are similar to those raised against Brainerd Currie's interest analysis
approach to resolving conflict of laws issues. For discussion of criticisms of the Currie method,
see Currie, The Verdict of the Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws, 28 U. CHI.
L. REv. 258 (1961); Hill, GovernmentalInterest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 463 (1960); Kozyris, No-Fault Automobile Insurance and the
Conflict of Laws-Cutting the GordianKnot Home-Style, 1972 DUKE L.J. 331, 348-51; Reese,
Recent Developments in Torts Choice-of-Law Thinking in the United States, 8 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L. L. 181 (1969).
121 Compare the proposal of a similar type of standard to analyze preemption questions
and the rationale developed to justify the utilization of that standard in Hirsch, Toward a
New View of FederalPreemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515. That standard also specified factors
to be considered in order to avoid problems of subjective evaluation, but, largely due to the
complex interrelationship between state and federal law in the preemption area, did not
provide precise weights to be attributed to particular factors. Because adoption and preemption questions share the problem of discerning the relationship between federal and state law
in individual cases, preemption concerns and solutions are relevant in considering objections
to the proposed standard.
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grams, and they assess possible conflicts between state law and the
interests of federal programs in other contexts requiring choice of
law determinations.'25 In addition, the conflict concept has been
fairly well developed by the courts in the adoption context, and its
application can be checked against the purpose of the adoption
option.
The proposed test also provides protections against excessive
subjectivity in the balancing stage. First, the test identifies the
components of state and federal interests that must be considered
in every case: avoiding disruption of existing state regulation,
achieving uniformity, and avoiding interference with the operation
of a federal program. Second, the components that are balanced are
fairly objective, as opposed to evaluative. The state interest considered at this stage is the impact that disregarding state law would
have on existing state regulation. This impact is to be determined
by focusing on the effects on activities conducted under the state
law; the court is not to evaluate the wisdom of the general policies
underlying the state's position.'26 The proposed test provides a similarly nonsubjective approach for analyzing federal interests: in considering uniformity and interference arguments, courts would be
limited to determining the actual impact on the specific federal
program, as opposed to evaluating the wisdom of the program. Furthermore, the proposed test indicates general guidelines for assessing the weights to be assigned the federal and state interests involved in the balancing stage.
These features of the proposed test do not eliminate the problem of indefiniteness entirely, but some lack of precision in advance
of judgment seems inherent in adoption questions.' 2 Accommodating the state and federal interests in connection with the operation

I' One basis for preemption decisions, for example, is a finding of conflict between the
state and the federal laws; the meaning of conflict in this context is similar to its meaning in
the adoption area. See Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism
and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975). See generally Hirsch, supra note 124.
121 Compare this standard with Currie's interest analysis approach, see note 123 supra,
which seems to require a determination of the policies and interests of the state in applying
its own law. See Reese, supra note 123, at 187.
'" See the detailed discussions of the complex interrelationships involved in this area of
federal-state relations in Hart, supra note 20, and Mishkin, supra note 3. Compare with the
proposed test the approach suggested by Hirsch to the similar interrelationships involved in
preemption questions. Hirsch, supra note 124. In United States v. Little Lake Misere Land
Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973), the Supreme Court faced the problem of this inherent imprecision
and indicated a willingness to engage in the analysis and examination of state and federal
interests necessary to determine the adoption issue with regard to the particular circumstances of the case.
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of a particular federal program requires a consideration of the relationship between the specific state law and federal program involved. Since the precise degrees of impact that the state law would
have on the federal program and that a uniform federal law would
have on state regulation depend on the particular characteristics of
the laws and the program in question, no precise quantification of
the weight to be accorded state and federal interests can be stated
in advance. The proposed test does provide a framework within
which this determination can be made, but courts must make the
determination of the specific weight to be accorded these interests
on the basis of the particular circumstances of each case.
Alternative tests which attempt to provide a more precise standard fail to fulfill the purposes behind the adoption option. One
possible method for determining the choice of law issue would be to
provide either that a uniform federal law would always apply or that
state law would always be adopted in adoption situations. While
this approach would eliminate imprecision, it would not in any way
accommodate state and federal interests. Such an approach would
be inconsistent with the determination which has been made that
neither the federal nor the state interests are sufficient to mandate
the exclusive application of either state or federal law in all adoption
situations. 12 Following this approach would sacrifice the flexibility
of adoption techniques for cases in which state law is a useful and
convenient tool for implementing a federal program and for those
129
in which uniform federal law is more appropriate.
A second approach would be to adopt state law unless the state
law would conflict with the interests of the federal program. While
this approach avoids the necessity of identifying the state interests
and balancing them against the federal interests, it cannot thoroughly accommodate state and federal interests because it fails to
consider interference with federal interests that, though significant,
does not amount to a conflict.
A third approach would be to adopt state law unless a conflict
is present or unless the federal interests are infringed to a certain
degree amounting to less than a conflict. 3 ' This test is more respon121See

p. 829 supra.
support for rejecting the alternative of utilizing federal law in all adoption

121Additional

situations is provided by courts' hesitation to develop federal law judicially unless a fairly
urgent need for this development is shown. See Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S.
63 (1966); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963); United States v. Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 271 F. Supp. 447 (E.D. Mo. 1966).
I A similar approach was proposed in 49 N.C.L. REv. 358, 365 (1971), suggesting that
there should be a presumption in favor of adopting state law which could be rebutted by a
showing of sufficient federal interest in the utilization of federal law.
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sive to the federal interests involved and would avoid the necessity
of determining the weight of state interests and balancing this
weight against that of the federal interests. Nevertheless, this test
involves some difficulties. While automatically precluding adoption
when the interference with federal interests amounts to a conflict is
justified in terms of the purpose of the adoption option, that purpose
affords no basis for determining what degree of impairment short of
a conflict should automatically preclude adopting state law. Wherever the line representing the sufficient degree of impairment is
drawn, the third test will yield some results which are incorrect in
terms of the purpose of the adoption option. By eliminating the
balancing stage, the test would require the rejection of state law in
all situations in which federal interests reached a certain magnitude, even when state interests would be greater on balance. 31 On
the other hand, state law would be adopted even when federal interests, though not reaching the magnitude required by the test, outweighed the state interests. These incorrect results might more
heavily favor federal or state interests depending on whether the line
representing the necessary impairment of federal interests is placed
at a low or high level.
A related problem with the third approach is the difficulty of
developing a discrete concept to express the degree of interference
less than a conflict which should preclude adoption. The standard
would presumably have to be formed in such loose terms as "significant" or "substantial" impact. Since the impact on federal interests
would have to be evaluated in terms of such nonspecific concepts,
the third test does not appear to offer any significant gains in clarity
over the proposed test.
The imprecision of the standard for determining the level of
interference necessary to preclude adoption and the absence of any
assessment of the state interests involved under this alternative test
may create a systemic bias favoring the use of uniform federal law.
If some degree of harm to federal interests exists, courts may well
tend to find this harm sufficient to mandate a uniform federal law,
preferring to protect known federal interests rather than the unknown state interests.

'' The possibility of incorrect results in favor of federal law is most grave in situations
in which the state law involved is in an area of traditionally local concern. See United States
v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966); United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237 (1960); RFC v. Beaver
County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[43:823

On balance, the test this comment proposes seems the most
appropriate one for determining whether to adopt state law. The
alternative tests attempt to provide a more precise rule by eliminating the balancing of federal and state interests but would be likely
to yield results inconsistent with the purpose of accommodating
those interests. The third test, although possibly more attuned than
the first two to the purpose of the adoption option, would still yield
results inconsistent with that purpose in some situations, and the
potential for incorrect results is not justified by any real gain in
precision. Consideration of these alternative tests supports the conclusion that the proposed test's failure to specify more precisely the
weights to be accorded the interests involved in particular cases is
inescapable if the purpose of the adoption option is to be systematically pursued. Of course, as cases are decided in light of the purpose
of the adoption option, the weights to be accorded particular federal
132
and state interests will become more precise.

IV.

APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED TEST TO THE FARMERS

HOME

ADMINISTRATION CASES

The circuit courts are presently in conflict over whether state
law should be adopted in actions by the Government against auctioneers for conversion arising out of the sale of cattle on which the
Government had chattel mortgages. The major issue in this series
1 33
of cases is whether lack of knowledge of the mortgages is a defense.
132 For an attempt to utilize previous determinations of relative weight in the adoption
area, see United States v. MacKenzie, 510 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1975). Cf. Hirsch, supra note
124, at 558.
133See cases cited notes 7, 8 supra. One of these cases, United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d
804 (5th Cir. 1971), involved the sale of mortgaged cotton, rather than mortgaged cattle.
Although the holding of the case as to the liability of those trading in property mortgaged to
the Government depended on the particular facts of the case, the court's decision to use a
uniform federal law to resolve the liability issue was based on factors similar to those considered in the cattle auctioneer cases. In addition, the Hext court in dicta affirmed the result
reached by the courts using uniform federal law in the cattle auctioneer cases. 444 F.2d at
810-11. Perhaps because the adoption issue in Hext appears so closely analogous, cases dealing with cattle auctioneers have often cited Hext without distinguishing it on the grounds of
the particular fact situation involved. The major cases are generally discussed in Note,
Auctioneers' Liability for Conversion Under the Packers and Stockyards Act, 67 YALE L.J.
504 (1958); 5 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 790 (1964); 45 CALIF. L. REv. 776 (1957); 43 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 132 (1967); 105 U. PA. L. REv. 266 (1956). It has been asserted that this conflict
among the circuits might become academic in the future since one case, United States v.
Hext, 444 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1971), has suggested that a federal rule be patterned after the
Uniform Commercial Code. United States v. E.W. Savage & Son, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 123, 125
n.1 (D.S.D. 1972), aff'd, 475 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973); see United States v. McClesky Mills,
Inc., 409 F.2d 1216 (5th Cir. 1969). However, Hext is the only major decision relying on the
U.C.C. to formulate the federal rule in this area, and the state U.C.C. provisions relevant to
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Applying the test proposed in this comment to the FmHA cases
resolves this conflict and demonstrates the operation of the test.
A.

The Farmers Home Administration Program

An analysis of the legislative history and statutory scheme of
the program' 34 reveals that the prerequisites for adoption analysis
are present and provides a framework for evaluating the federal and
state interests involved. The primary purpose of the FmHA loan
program is to enable farmers who cannot qualify for commercial or
35
other government credit to acquire and maintain farm ownership.'
The program emphasizes aiding farmers rather than conducting a
profitable business venture;' 36 lending to farmers regardless of their
creditworthiness was justified as a form of social lending with na37
tional benefits.'
Congress never considered what law might govern the liability
of auctioneers or others acting as conduits for property mortgaged
to the Government under the FmHA programs. Nor did Congress
emphasize general procedures for collecting loans in the event of
default.'38 Instead, Congress looked primarily to the selection proceauctioneer liability appear to vary; the question would still require resolution in those states
where the U.C.C. is contrary to the federal law in Hext. See United States v. Big Z Warehouse, 311 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Ga. 1970). Finally, there actually has been a conflict in this
area without significant reference to the U.C.C. This conflict among the circuits regarding
the application of the standard for determining whether to adopt state law and the positions
of the various circuits, particularly the Eighth Circuit, are also evidenced in connection with
other areas of FmHA administration-waiver of liens and consent to sale: see, e.g., United
States v. Central Livestock Ass'n, 349 F. Supp. 1033 (D.N.D. 1972); United States v. Loken,
291 F. Supp. 432 (D.S.D. 1968); United States v. Hansen, 203 F. Supp. 326 (S.D. Iowa 1962),
a/f'd, 311 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1963); and priority of liens: see, e.g., United States v. GregoryBeaumont Equip. Co., 243 F.2d 591 (8th Cir. 1957); United States v. Squires, 378 F. Supp.
798 (S.D. Iowa 1974); Fred W. Beal, Inc. v. Allen, 287 F. Supp. 126 (D. Me. 1968).
3I The most recent legislation on the FmHA is the Consolidated Farmers Home Administration Act of 1961. Agriculture Act of 1961, tit. I1, 75 Stat. 307 (codified in scattered
sections of 7 U.S.C.).
"' See, e.g., Hearingson S. 1800 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Agriculture
and Forestry, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11, 23 (1935). No hearings were held on the Senate bill
introduced in the session in which the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act (the initial legislation in the area of FmHA loans) was passed. The Act followed closely the provisions of S.
1800, on which hearings were held.
'3' See id. at 23, 33, 49 (1935); 81 CONG. REc. 6469 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Biermann).
'37 See Hearingson H.R. 4384 Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 78th Cong., 2d
Sess. 43-44 (1944) (statement of Mr. Westbrook). H.R. 4384 was a predecessor bill to that
introduced in the House during the session that the Farmers Home Administration Act of
1946 was adopted. No hearings were held on the latter bill; instead the hearings on H.R. 4384
were relied on in the congressional debates. See 92 CONG. REc. 3362 (1946) (remarks of Rep.
Cooley).
11 See, e.g., Hearingson S. 1800 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Agriculture
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dure and to continuing supervision of loan recipients to protect the
Government's security interests. 3 ' Congress did not stress any need
for uniform procedures or results under the program;4 0 rather, the
need for decentralized administration and local cooperative efforts
was emphasized.' The lack of congressional attention to the problem of auctioneers' liability and the lack of emphasis on uniformity,
coupled with the fact that the issue arises from the operation of a
43
federal program, 42 opens the possibility of adopting state law.
B.

The Conflict Criterion

The majority of state laws involved in those FmHA cases which
analyzed the content of the laws provided the auctioneer with a
defense to an action for the conversion of mortgaged chattels if the
auctioneer did not know of the mortgage; the uniform federal law,
either preexisting or formulated in the cases, precluded such a defense.'44 Application of the conflict criterion requires a determination of whether allowing a defense based on lack of knowledge of the
mortgage would nullify aspects of the FmHA program.
No court expressly concluded that a direct conflict was present.
Indeed, two of the courts which adopted state law argued that using
familiar and developed state laws would facilitate the business
transactions involved with the FmHA programs, thereby helping
both the farming community at large and the low-income farmers
for whose benefit the program was designed. 45 Nevertheless, some
and Forestry, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, 33 (1935); 81 CONG. REc. 6469, 6679 (1937) (remarks
of Rep. Biermann and Sen. Connally).
,' See, e.g., 81 CONG. REC. 6454 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Wadsworth).
,4oSee, e.g., id. at 6459, 6478 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Hope and Rep. Cooley).
14 See, e.g., id. at 6459 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Hope).
m See United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712, 716 (3d. Cir. 1963).
,,' The FmHA regulations, 7 C.F.R. §§ 1800.1-1980.495 (1976), also do not address the
question of third party liability for conversion. In the event of sale of the chattel, the regulations emphasize collection from the borrower before proceeding against a third party. See,
e.g., id. § 1871.22 (1976). The regulations considering possible liability of third parties concern
third party purchasers, not auctioneers. See, e.g., id. § 1871.22 (1976). Compare these FmHA
regulations, with 7 C.F.R. §§ 1800.41-.42 (1976), providing that federal law governs a wife's
liability, presumably in response to United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
"' United States v. Chappell Livestock Auction, Inc., 523 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Carson, 372 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1967); United States v. Kramel, 234 F.2d 577
(8th Cir. 1956). In United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 909 (1964), the content of the state law was not specified because the courts focused
on the need for uniformity. In United States v. Matthews, 244 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1957), the
court did not discuss the content of state law because both parties agreed that federal law
should govern. In United States v. Union Livestock Sales Co., 298 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1962),
both state and federal law imposed liability without knowledge.
"I See United States v. Chappell Livestock Auction, Inc., 523 F.2d 840, 841 (8th Cir.
1975); United States v. Union Livestock Co., 298 F.2d 755, 759 (4th Cir. 1962).
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of the courts which used a uniform federal law focused on certain
aspects of the state laws in a way which can be viewed as raising
conflicts arguments.'46 Asserting that one purpose of the program
was protection of the Government's security in the loans,'47 these
courts argued that holding an auctioneer strictly liable helped safeguard the Government's interests by providing an additional remedy to augment the security of the loans.' The courts also suggested
that loans would not be as readily available if the only remedy for
conversion were against the borrower.'45
A persuasive argument can be made that adopting state laws
allowing lack of knowledge as a defense would not conflict with the
purposes of the FmHA program. Conflict, as defined by the courts,
implies a nullification of aspects of the federal program involved, a
contradiction of the purposes of the program.' 0 The two major effects of using the state laws in question are that the auctioneer who
has no knowledge of an outstanding mortgage is relieved of liability
and that the Government, unless it can collect from the borrower,
assumes the loss from the unauthorized sale of mortgaged cattle.
Neither of these results impairs the operation of the FmHA program
to a degree that creates a conflict.
Using state law that allows auctioneers who have no knowledge
of outstanding mortgages to avoid liability has no detrimental impact on the purpose of the FmHA program, aiding high-risk farmers.
Rather, the major effect on FmHA loan recipients would be to preserve for their sales the same legal consequences which attend the
transactions of other farmers within the state. When the state law
provides a defense of lack of knowledge in connection with other
mortgages, to preclude this defense for FmHA mortgages alone
would place FmHA farmers in these states at a comparative disad" The arguments on the conflict, uniformity, and local interest criteria in the text have
been collected from various cases and organized to present a more coherent and complete
position.
"I See United States v. Carson, 372 F.2d 429, 433 (6th Cir. 1967). Given the frequent

characterization of the FmHA program as a measure to aid farmers, attributing such a
commercial purpose to the program seems incorrect. See text and notes at notes 135-37 supra.
See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1800 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and
Forestry, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, 33 (1935) (statements of Mr. Gray and Mr. Rankin); 81
CONG. REC. 6469 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Biermann).
" See United States v. Carson, 372 F.2d 429, 433-35 (6th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712, 717 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 909 (1964).
"I United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712, 717 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
909 (1964).
1- See text and notes at notes 73-78 supra.
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vantage to other farmers,'"' thereby harming those whom the pro2
gram is designed to aid.'1
Nor would imposing the losses incurred through unauthorized
sales of FmHA mortgaged property on the Government conflict with
the purpose or functioning of the FmHA program.'5 3 Placing such
costs on the Government does not endanger the existence of the
FmHA loan programs. Congress has expressed satisfaction with the
record of repayment of FmHA loans,'5 4 indicating that the amount
"IThis discussion is not meant to suggest that denying a defense for the auctioneer will
always have a detrimental effect on FmHA farmers. Denying such a defense in regard to
FmHA mortgages in a state which generally denies the defense in actions for conversion of
mortgaged properties would not disadvantage FmHA farmers. Rather, denying the defense
in such states would again preserve for FmHA farmers the same legal ramifications accorded
the transactions of other farmers.
,"2 An auctioneer in a state which generally allows lack of knowledge that the goods he
sells are mortgaged as a defense has two options if no such defense is allowed in connection
with FmHA mortgages: he could attempt to protect himself by learning of the existence of
the government mortgage, or he could assume liability without knowledge and insure against
it. The first alternative is problematic. An auctioneer usually does not know what cattle are
going to be auctioned until the day of the sale. See United States v. Sommerville, 211 F.
Supp. 843 (W.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd, 324 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 909
(1964). He would therefore probably have to obtain information about all the farmers who
had FmHA chattel mortgages on their cattle. While lists of borrowers are available, the lists
are required to carry warnings of inaccuracy or incompleteness. 7 C.F.R. § 1871.6 (1976). After
obtaining information concerning those farmers with FmHA mortgages, the auctioneer might
decide not to handle any of the cattle of farmers who had FmHA mortgages because of
uncertainty concerning which cattle of a particular farmer are mortgaged. See, e.g., Cassidy
Comm'n Co. v. United States, 387 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1967). Alternatively, he might charge
more to farmers with FmHA mortgages because of doubt concerning the mortgaged status of
the cattle. On the other hand, if the auctioneer determines to assume the risk of possible
liability and to insure against it, he would probably increase his commission. If he increased
his commission for FmHA farmers only, these farmers would again be put at a disadvantage
compared to other farmers by the extra expense. The effect of any of these steps is to disadvantage the FmHA farmers by imposing obstacles to their marketing of cattle which are not
imposed on other farmers in the state, since sales for these other farmers would not expose
the auctioneer to liability.
10 See generally Ault v. Harris, 317 F. Supp. 373 (D. Alas. 1968), afj'd mem., 432 F.2d
441 (9th Cir. 1970) (arguing that the protection of the federal treasury should not be controlling when the Government is engaged in local money-lending activities). Arguments for
protecting the federal fisc by changing the elements of a cause of action related to the
administration of a program can and should be dealt with by Congress. See United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947). In fact, Congress has attempted to alter the distribution of costs under another agricultural program through changing the elements of a cause of
action related to the administration of this program. In the Agricultural Act of 1961, Title
III of which was the Consolidated Farmers Home Administration Act of 1961, Congress
eliminated the requirement of "willfulness" from the cause of action in civil proceedings for
exceeding quotas under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937; the stated purpose of this elimination was to increase the ease and effectiveness of enforcement of the
provisions of the Act. See H.R. REP. No. 839, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1961).
"I'See Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. 615, 644 (1961); 107 CONG. REC. 13752 (1961) (remarks of Rep. Matthews). The charge-
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lost through all defaults has not had a large impact on the continuing viability of the program.'55 Furthermore, by adopting this social
lending program, the Government was arguably willing to assume
the burden of some losses in this high credit risk area.
Once it has been determined that there is no conflict between
the state law and the federal program, the proposed test requires a
balancing of state and federal interests.' 6
C.

The Uniformity Criterion

While numerous arguments concerning uniformity' 7' were discussed in the cases on this issue, uniformity was invoked more as a
talisman than as an analytical tool. The courts which have adopted
state law have contended that there is no need for uniformity in
connection with these loan transactions,' 8 bolstering this argument
off and judgment rates on FmHA loans were also considered low. See Hearings on H. R. 6400
Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 621 (1961). And it was felt
that the rate of refinancing under the programs was good. (Refinancing under another loan
program is required when a farmer is able to assume loans with higher interest rates.) See
id. at 634. The hearings on H.R. 6400 were the House hearings on the Agricultural Act of 1961,
Title III of which was the Consolidated Farmers Home Administration Act of 1961.
I" After expressing satisfaction with the level of repayment, Congress loosened some of
the restrictions on FmHA loans in the Consolidated Farmers Home Administration Act of
1961, the most recent major legislation governing the FmHA. See Hearings on H.R. 6400
Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 657 (1961). For example, both
direct and insured loans were authorized to be made up to 100 percent of the value of real
estate security. See id. at 616 (1961). In addition the limits on the amount of loans available
were raised. See 107 CONG. REc. 13477 (1961) (remarks of Rep. Cooley).
'" Interferences with the federal program not amounting to a conflict are not considered
in the balancing stage in connection with these FmHA cases. As implied in the consideration
of the conflict criterion, adoption of state law providing a defense to liability in states which
generally provide such a defense does not seem to have a detrimental impact on the purpose
or functioning of the FmHA programs, but rather seems to be in consonance with them.
Arguments based on interferences not amounting to a conflict should therefore carry little
weight. Since the arguments on interference would be essentially identical to those already
discussed in regard to conflict, they are not treated separately in the text.
,",Two introductory points concerning uniformity in the FmHA context should be noted.
First, refusal to adopt state law may not necessarily lead to uniformity in this context because
the courts have drawn on various authorities as the source of their "uniform" federal law.
See, e.g., United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Carson, 372
F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1967); Mishkin, supra note 3, at 813. Second, the FmHA has the power to
change its regulations so as to require a uniform federal law. Cf. 7 C.F.R. §§ 1800.41-.42 (1976)
(requiring that the FmHA liability of wives be governed by federal law). See also note 143
supra. The fact that the FmHA has not promulgated such regulations in connection with
auctioneer liability seems to imply that it is unconcerned with the present disuniform state
of the law.
',' See United States v. Chappell Livestock Auction, Inc., 523 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Kramel, 234 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1956). This argument basically seems to be
dealing with uniformity of administration. See, e.g., United States v. Kramel, 234 F.2d 577,
580-81 (8th Cir. 1956).
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by noting the absence of any congressional indication that uniformity was necessary.'59 In contrast, the courts which have refused to
adopt state law have contended that uniformity is necessary, arguing that the diversity of legal effects resulting from adopting state
law would undermine the administration of the program because
the program itself and the terms of the loans would have to be
framed with reference to the particular law of each state."' These
courts have also taken the position that state law should not be used
without a clear congressional intent to do so.' Finally, these courts
have suggested that uniformity is necessary to prevent uncertainty,
particularly the uncertainty which could result from changes in
state law."6 2
The arguments for and against uniformity focus primarily on
uniformity for purposes of easing federal administration.'6 3 The purpose underlying the adoption choice does not justify giving great
"I'See United States v. Chappell Livestock Auction, Inc., 523 F.2d 840, 841 (8th Cir.
1975); United States v. Kramel, 234 F.2d 577, 580-81 (8th Cir. 1956).
160See United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
909 (1964). This argument was specifically recognized as dealing with uniformity for purposes
of administrative ease. Id. at 716.
101 See United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712, 717 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 909 (1964). In both lines of cases the arguments concerning congressional intent on the
subject of uniformity seem irrelevant at this stage in evaluating the need for uniformity; if
Congress had indicated that uniformity was necessary, the issue of whether to adopt state
law would not have arisen. These arguments are best viewed as revealing a predisposition in
favor either of using federal law or of adopting state law, or as indicating the weight which a
court feels should be given the need for uniformity in balancing it against the specific local
interests involved.
"I See United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1971). Again this argument suggests
an emphasis on administrative ease, since it is not argued that this uncertainty would conflict
with the interests of the federal program, but only that it would render the administration of
the program somewhat more difficult.
10 See United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712, 716 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 909 (1964); United States v. Kramel, 234 F.2d 577, 580-81 (8th Cir. 1956). See also notes
158-62 supra. The argument made in United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 909 (1964), can be viewed as attempting to establish that the
"uncertainty" created by adopting state law would actually impair the FmHA loan program.
Given the operation and purposes of the FmHA program, however, it is unlikely that adopting
state law would either impose a great administrative burden or interfere significantly with
the implementation of the program. "Uncertainty" as to the outcome of litigation by the
Government in the individual states could easily be overcome by examining the laws of the
particular states involved. Whether or not lack of knowledge is a defense to an action in a
particular state is a relatively clear-cut issue, and since the administration of the program is
decentralized, the FmHA would have frequent contact with state law. If, however, "uncertainty" refers to the possibility of the Government's being unable to collect a judgment from
an auctioneer in all states, suggesting that an inability to collect would harm the operation
of the FmHA program, see United States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712, 714-15 (3d Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 909 (1964), the argument blends into the conflict/interference argument, which has been discredited above. See text and notes at notes 153-56 supra.
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weight to ease of administration arguments unless disuniformity
would have a significant detrimental impact on the administration
of the specific program involved2 6' Disuniformity is unlikely to have
a serious detrimental impact on the administration of the FmHA
loan program since much of the program is decentralized and administered through local committees.'65
D.

The Local Interest Criterion

In analyzing this factor, the courts have focused on whether the
area of law in question is one of traditionally local concern. Courts
which have adopted state law have argued that state tort law affecting title to personal property is an area of traditionally local concern,' 66 while those which have utilized uniform federal law have
argued that this area of law does not fall within the major categories
accorded such status-real property transactions and domestic relations." 7
Concededly, this area of law does not fall within these two
categories. However, in United States v. Standard Oil Co.'6" the
Supreme Court suggested that some aspects of tort law may involve
questions of peculiarly local concern.16 The major reason for according great weight to areas of particularly local concern, the dislocation that would result if an integrated area of state law were partially subjected to federal control,'7 0 is present in the FmHA cases.
Even if this dislocation is not considered severe enough to warrant
the conclusion that the area of state law involved is one of traditionally local concern, it is sufficient to support a strong state interest
71
in favor of adopting state law.'
"I See text and notes at notes 104-06 supra. Recent cases suggest that uniformity for
administrative ease is being deemphasized as a ground for utilizing a uniform federal law.
See United States v. O'Connell, 496 F.2d 1329, 1332 (2d Cir. 1974); cf. Bumb v. United States,
276 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1960). See also note 113 supra.
"I See text and note at note 141 supra; cf. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966);
RFC v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946); Ewing v. Small Business Administration, 359 F.
Supp. 16 (E.D. La. 1973).
I See United States v. Chappell Livestock Auction, Inc., 523 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Kramel, 234 F.2d 577, 581 (8th Cir. 1956). These cases argued that in areas
of local concern, there must be substantial reasons to override state law, such as a clear
congressional intent to do so.
"I See United States v. Carson, 372 F.2d 429, 434 (6th Cir. 1967). This narrow approach
to areas of traditionally local concern can be viewed as indicating that little weight is being

given to state interests in deciding the adoption question.
, 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
'T'

Id. at 310-11.
See United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237, 241-42 (1960); text and note at note 119

supra.
"I See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 599 (1973); text at
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State laws providing a lack of knowledge defense to liability for
172
cattle auctioneers further the quick flow of livestock in commerce.
Carving out a segment of the auctioning process in which federal law
would apply would create disuniformity which would impair expeditious commerce in cattle. 171 This impairment could be significant
since a large percentage of cattle marketing, particularly in the
states in which these actions have arisen, is conducted through such
private auctions. 174 The local interest criterion therefore weighs
heavily in favor of adopting state law.
E.

Resolution of the Adoption Question

The proposed test dictates that state law should be adopted in
the FmHA cases. There is no conflict between state laws providing
a defense of lack of knowledge to an auctioneer and the interests of
the FmHA program. In the balancing stage of the analysis, the
federal interest in uniformity is fairly weak, while the dislocation of
state activities resulting from the utilization of a uniform federal
law would be serious. The state interests outweigh the federal interests, and therefore state law should be adopted.
CONCLUSION

This comment has attempted to develop a test for determining
whether a court should adopt state law as the content of a federal
note 121 supra.
"I See United States v. Chappell Livestock Auction, Inc., 523 F.2d 840, 842 n.2 (8th Cir.
1975).
,13Id.; cf. O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F.2d 539 (1st Cir. 1940). Auctioneers'
attempts to protect against liability imposed by a federal law would probably aggravate the
detrimental effects a special federal law would have on the flow of commerce. See note 152
supra.
"I See H. DEGRAFF, BEEF: PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION 154 (1960). For a description of
the activities involved with a private auction, see United States v. Sommerville, 211 F. Supp.
843 (W.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd, 324 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 909 (1964). The
fact situation in the FmHA cases suggests an additional difficulty caused by using a uniform
federal law different from the general state law to govern an issue in an adoption context. In
these cases the Government is attempting to recover from third parties with whom it had no
original dealings. These third parties may not have expected to deal with the Government or
to have their activities judged according to federal standards. In the FmHA cases, it might
be possible for an auctioneer to ascertain whether he would potentially be dealing with the
Government through a search of the record of chattel mortgages or from lists obtained from
the FmHA, see note 152 supra (concerning the possible inaccuracy of these lists), but this
solution begs the question, since the issue in these cases is whether this burden should be
placed on the auctioneer. Furthermore, this solution has its own detrimental results. See text
and note at note 152 supra; United States v. Chappell Livestock Auction, Inc., 523 F.2d 840,
842 n.2 (8th Cir. 1975); Note, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Suits, 69 YALE L.J. 1428, 144446 (1960).
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rule of decision. The proposed test is designed to overcome the analytical deficiencies apparent in the case law and to yield results
more consistent with the purpose of the adoption option. The net
result of using the proposed test would be to encourage wider use of
state law in connection with governmental activities than is generally allowed under current adoption decisions. By stressing the need
for a direct conflict before adoption can be automatically precluded,
the proposed test demands an analysis of the specific purposes of
the federal program involved and of the impact state law would
have on these purposes. General arguments concerning interference
with federal interests will be given little weight in the adoption
decision. The proposed test also decreases the emphasis given to
arguments invoking a generalized need for uniformity and requires
critical analysis of the actual interests underlying need for uniformity arguments. Finally, the test broadens the category of state interests which may be weighed in the balancing process to include impacts on state regulation outside areas of traditionally local concern.
Applying the proposed test to the FmHA cases illustrates that the
test can accomplish the purpose of accommodating the state and
federal interests involved in the implementation of a federal program more consistently and effectively than the approaches now
used by the courts. Under the proposed test, the suggestion in
Clearfield that courts may choose state law to determine the content
of federal rules can and should be followed more frequently.
Theresa C. O'Loughlin

